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COMMENTS
PRO SE LITIGANT'S ELIGIBILITY FOR
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER FOIA: CROOKER
v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
The traditional American rule regarding attorney fees requires
that, absent an equitable1 or statutory2 exception, each party liti-
The courts have developed three major equitable exceptions to the general rule
against fee shifting: the "bad faith" theory, the "common benefit" theory, and the "private
attorney general" theory. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
275 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Whether the private attorney general theory remains a
basis for an award of attorney fees is doubtful. See note 2 infra. For a discussion of the rise
and fall of the private attorney general theory, see Hermann & Hoffmann, Financing Public
Interest Litigation in State Court: A Proposal for Legislative Action, 63 CORNELL L. REV.
173, 175-83 (1978).
The more traditional theories of "bad faith" and "common benefit" derived from the
equity powers of the English Court of Chancery. See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S.
Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930). Under
the bad faith exception, which was originally recognized in the United States in the case of
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939), an award of attorney fees is
justified when a party engages in a continual pattern of evasion and obstruction, Fairley v.
Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir.
1963) (en banc), or where the plaintiff was forced into unnecessary litigation, even if the
defendant ultimately prevailed, McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972); Marston v. American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035,
1042 (1st Cir. 1971).
The "common fund" theory is based on the premise that a single party should not be
charged with the entire cost of attorney fees when his legal victory benefits an entire class.
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1973); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939).
Although counsel fees generally are drawn from the funds recovered in the litigation, fees
may be awarded where no actual monetary fund has been created. Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). For examples of other nonstatutory exceptions to the
American rule, notably contractual provisions for attorney fees, see Comment, Theories of
Recovering Attorney's Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 47 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv.
566, 567-68 (1979).
' The federal statutory exceptions to the rule that each litigant must pay his own attor-
ney are numerous. E.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); Copyright Act
§ 101, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976); Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. § 784(g)
(1976). For a list of 90 statutory fee award provisions, see SUBCOMMrrEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY CoMmITTEE, CivIL RIGHTS ATroRNEY's FEES AwARDs ACT OF
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gant pay his own attorney.3 One such statutory exception is con-
tained in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),' which permits
1976-SouRcE BOOK: LEGISLATr HMsTORY, TExTs AND oTHmR DoculszaS (1976). The stat-
utes vary in the degree of discretion which the judiciary may exercise in making fee awards
and in the nature of the eligible parties. See generally Note, The Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 52 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 562, 562 n.4 (1978). Statutory exceptions
also arise at the state level. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1978); ALAsKA STAT. §
09.60.015(a) (1973); NEv. REv. STAT. § 18.010 (1977). For a discussion of state attorney fee
statutes based on "bad faith conduct," see Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest
Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301, 336 & n.154 (1973).
The statutory exceptions have assumed greater importance in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In
Alyeska, the Supreme Court severely curtailed use of the "private attorney general" doc-
trine as a basis for an award of attorney fees. Id. at 269. Confirming prior law to the effect
that "bad faith" and "common fund" are proper equitable bases for fee awards, id. at 257-
59, the Court stated that courts must find justification for any other award of fees in a
specific statutory authorization. Id. at 262. The Court reasoned that it would be a usurpa-
tion of legislative power to base a fee award on judicial estimates of the importance of the
policy at issue. Id. at 269.
3 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973). The American rule differs from the practice in some other nations.
Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
Ray. 636, 641 (1974). For example, in Great Britain, attorney fees are awarded to the pre-
vailing party. Id. The origin of the American rule has been attributed to a general distrust
of lawyers, id., to distinctively American traditions of individualism, Note, Attorney's Fees:
Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VmD. L. Rav. 1216, 1220-21 (1967), and to the
failure of statutory attorney fees to keep up with the rising costs of living. Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALn. L. Ray. 792, 798-99
(1966). For a brief discussion of the British rule, see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1966).
The American rule against "fee shifting" has been severely criticized, however, prima-
rily because it lacks the deterrent qualities inherent in fee shifting and, therefore, may en-
courage groundless litigation. See Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litiga-
tion?, 49 IowA L. Rv. 75, 78 (1963). It also has been contended that the plaintiff is not truly
made whole when he still must pay his attorney fee. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel
Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792, 792 (1966). For a discussion of the need
to reform the American rule, see Kuenzel, supra, at 78; McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attor-
ney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FoRDHAM L. Ray. 761 (1972);
Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. Rev. 202
(1966). Proponents of the rule argue, however, that a contrary rule unfairly penalizes a liti-
gant who brings a claim in good faith and discourages poorer litigants from pressing claims.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); Oelrichs v.
Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872); see Comment, Theories of Recovering Attorneys'
Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 47 U. Mo. KAN. CrrY L. Rzv. 566, 590-91 (1979).
Nevertheless, the continuing vitality of the American rule is evident. See Farmer v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964).
4 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. I 1979). The premise underlying the FOIA is that full
public disclosure ensures decisionmaking by an informed electorate. H.R. RE'. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2429. As
such, it is one of a series of laws relating to disclosure. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. § 552a (1976); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976); Federal
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a court to award "reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs rea-
sonably incurred." 5 A prerequisite to an award of attorney fees
Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1976). The policy favoring government disclo-
sure is not, however, without exceptions. Congress specifically excluded nine categories of
information from the FOIA disclosure requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979). Exempted materials may include national defense secrets, internal agency rules,
trade secrets, and medical files. Id. Not all exempt documents, however, must be withheld.
Even clearly exempt documents must be released unless the agency determines that such
release would be harmful "to the public interest." Letter from Attorney General Griffin Bell
to heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies (May 5, 1977), reprinted in [1979] GOV'T
DISCLOSURE (P-H) V 300,775. For example, law enforcement material must be released unless
public disclosure would decrease the efficacy of specific crime detection techniques. Attor-
ney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act
(February 1975), reprinted in [1979] Gov'T DISCLOSURE (P-H) 1 300,701.
The 1974 Amendments to the FOIA, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976)), strengthened administrative procedures and penalties in order to effec-
tuate the general aims of the Act and to encourage prompt and complete government re-
sponses to requests for information. For example, a strict timetable was enacted whereby
agencies must reply to an information request within 10 days of receipt, with either a release
of the information or a denial accompanied by a notice of the appeal process. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1976). Appeals must be decided within 20 days, id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii), with
one discretionary 10 day extension at either the initial or appeal stage. Id. § 552(a)(6)(B).
An agency's failure to comply with the appropriate deadline entitles the complainant to file
suit immediately to force disclosure. Id. § 552(a)(6)(C). Also, penalties were imposed for
violations of the Act. Agency employees who withhold information "arbitrarily or capri-
ciously" are subject to disciplinary action. Id. § 552(a)(4)(F). See generally Vaughn, The
Sanctions Provision of the Freedom of Information Act Amendments, 25 Am. U.L. REv. 7
(1975).
5 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). What amount will be deemed a "rea-
sonable" attorney fee is determined on a case-by-case basis by evaluating various factors.
See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Ameri-
can Bar Association has suggested eight factors upon which the amount of a fee may be
based:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBIIrry, DR 2-106(B) (1976). These criteria have been
adopted by the First Circuit, see King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978), and similar criteria have been used in other circuits, see
Finney v. Hutto, 548 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1977), afl'd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Kerr v. Screen
Extra's Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); John-
son v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1974).
Despite the language of the statute, attorney fees do not necessarily have to be "in-
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under the FOIA is that the plaintiff must have "substantially pre-
vailed."' Once this threshold determination has been made, the
court then balances various factors in order to determine whether
an award is appropriate in the particular case.7 Conflict has arisen,
curred" in order to be recoverable. Courts have approved awards of attorney fees in cases
involving legal service organizations where plaintiffs incur no actual fee, Palmigiano v. Gar-
rahy, 616 F.2d 598, 601 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 115 (1980); Mid-Hudson Legal
Serv., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1978); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598,
606-07 (5th Cir. 1974), and where legal expenses were covered by insurance, Ellis v. Cassidy,
625 F.2d 227, 230 (9th Cir. 1980).
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). A plaintiff may substantially prevail by showing that
the suit was necessary for and causally related to disclosure. Vermont Low Income Advoc.
Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976). A final judgment, however, is not a
prerequisite to an award of attorney fees. Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 559
F.2d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
accord, Vermont Low Income Advoc. Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.
1976); Biberman v. FBI, No. 79-2313 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1980) (authorizing award of in-
terim attorney fees when appropriate). Nor must all the requested documents be released.
Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F. Supp. 1049 (D.D.C. 1974), af'd, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In
addition, the complainant may be deemed to have substantially prevailed even if the litiga-
tion terminated due to the government's acceding to disclosure of the information re-
quested. Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). This prevents the govern-
ment from averting an attorney fee award by releasing the information subsequent to
commencement of the suit. Vermont Low Income Advoc. Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d
509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976).
7 The judicial award of attorney fees is discretionary. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
The Senate, however, had proposed that the following factors be considered in making such
awards: the benefit to the public from the case; the commercial benefit to the complainant;
the nature of the complainant's interest in the records; and whether the government's with-
holding of information had a reasonable basis in law. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1974), reprinted in HousE COMM. ON GOV'T OPMAxxONS & SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1974, pt. 1, at
171 (Joint Comm. Print 1975). The Senate report also gave examples illustrating eqch of the
four factors:
Under the first criterion a court would ordinarily award fees, for example, where a
newsman was seeking information to be used in a publication or a public interest
group was seeking information to further a project benefitting the general public,
but it would not award fees if a business was using the FOIA to obtain data relat-
ing to a competitor or as a substitute for discovery in private litigation with the
government.
Under the second criterion a court would usually allow recovery of fees where
the complainant was indigent or a nonprofit public interest group versus [sic] but
would not if it was a large corporate interest (or a representative of such an inter-
est). For the purposes of applying this criterion, news interests should not be con-
sidered commercial interests.
Under the third criterion a court would generally award fees if the complain-
ant's interest in the information sought was scholarly or journalistic or public-
interest oriented, but would not do so if his interest was of a frivolous or purely
commercial nature.
Finally, under the fourth criterion a court would not award fees where the
government's withholding had a colorable basis in law but would ordinarily award
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however, as to whether the FOIA authorizes an award of attorney
fees to an otherwise qualified plaintiff who litigates pro se.8 Re-
cently, in Crooker v. United States Department of Justice,9 the
First Circuit held that attorney fees are not recoverable under the
FOIA by a prisoner appearing pro se.10
Michael Crooker, a federal prisoner, wrote to the Department
of Justice and requested a copy of specific materials describing the
role of the federal prosecutor. I" After receiving no reply within the
them if the withholding appeared to be merely to avoid embarrassment or to frus-
trate the requester. Whether the case involved a return to court by the same com-
plainant seeking the same or similar documents a second time should be consid-
ered by the Court under this criterion.
Id. These criteria were omitted from the final version of the bill, however, because in addi-
tion to the belief that they were unnecessary, it was feared that "a statement of the criteria
[might] be too delimiting." S. CONG. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6267, 6288. Although courts are not required to employ
these standards, they have been adopted widely as a framework within which to consider
the prevailing party's claim for attorney fees. See Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529
(5th Cir. 1978); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Vermont Low Income
Advoc. Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976); American Fed'n of Gov't Employ-
ees v. Rosen, 418 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. IMI. 1976).
8 Compare Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980) and
Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1980) with Crooker v. Department
of Treasury, No. 80-0081 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 1980) and Marschner v. Department of State,
470 F. Supp. 196 (D. Conn. 1979).
632 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1980).
10 Id. at 921-22. A pro se litigant is one who appears on his own behalf without an
attorney. Almost 20% of the annual federal caseload is comprised of cases involving pro se
litigants, approximately 95% of whom are state and federal prisoners. Zeigler & Hermann,
The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 157, 159-60 (1972). A party may choose to appear pro se for a variety of reasons. See
Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 YALE L.J. 292,
293 n.7 (1976). The underlying rationale for official recognition of pro se appearances, how-
ever, lies in the need to provide indigent persons with access to the courts. See Note, Litiga-
tion Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J. 516, 525 (1968). In fact, most
pro se litigants are indigent and file informa pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976).
Zeigler & Hermann, supra, at 187. See also Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Pris-
oner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. Rv. 610, 617-21 (1979). Al-
though the indigent may be assigned counsel, he may prefer to appear pro se because he is
convinced that an assigned attorney would not make a sufficient effort on his behalf. Note,
Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. RFv. 514, 526. In addition, pro se plaintiffs
may be litigating issues which are unattractive or "beyond the realm" of the average attor-
ney. See United States v. Satan & His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971). The court's
dealings with inadequately prepared and agitated pro se litigants are frequently frustrating.
Doyle, The Courts Responsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JuDicATURE 406, 406 (1973).
Consequently, commentators have suggested modifications directed at weeding out frivolous
pro se claims while preserving legitimate suits. See, e.g., Zeigler & Hermann, supra, at 205-
19.
11 632 F.2d at 917.
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period prescribed by law, Crooker filed a FOIA suit to force disclo-
sure.12 Subsequently, two documents were tendered by the Depart-
ment of Justice. Satisfied with the receipt of these materials,
Crooker moved for a dismissal of the action and an award of attor-
ney fees.13 Although the motion to dismiss was granted, the district
court denied the motion for attorney fees, holding that no award
was warranted since Crooker had not "substantially prevailed" on
his claim and had appeared pro se.1
On appeal the First Circuit affirmed the denial of attorney
fees, holding that awards of attorney fees to pro se litigants are not
authorized under the FOIA.15 Writing for a unanimous panel,
Judge Bownes initially addressed the requirement that the plain-
tiff substantially prevail and concluded that this requirement had
been met. 6 The court then turned to the question of whether the
12 Id.; see note 4 supra. At approximately the same time that Crooker filed suit, the
United States Attorney's office advised Crooker that it did not have the documents re-
quested. 632 F.2d at 917. After receiving this response Crocker notified the U.S. Attorney
that he had filed suit to compel disclosure. Id. Approximately 6 weeks later, a 42-page pam-
phlet entitled "Material Relating to Prosecutorial Discretion" was released to Crooker. Id. A
second document, specifically relating to prosecution officials in the District of Massachu-
setts, was released and forwarded 6 months after the initial release. Id. The second release
may have been due in part to Crooker's motion requesting a Vaughn-type index. Id. The
Vaughn motion, a crucial discovery tool for the FOIA litigant, asks the court to order a
detailed justification for the denial of disclosure, indexed by cross reference to the docu-
ments. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
977 (1974).
Although previous FOIA actions had been commenced by Crooker in the District of
Columbia, e.g., Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 635 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir.
1980), this action was commenced in the District of Connecticut, which was a proper venue
district under the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). Crooker may have been influ-
enced by a favorable ruling on pro se fees handed down 2 weeks earlier by the Connecticut
district court. See Marschner v. Department of State, 470 F. Supp. 196 (D. Conn. 1979).
Xl 632 F.2d at 917. Crooker requested $165 in attorney fees. Id.
14 Id. at 918. In denying the motion for attorney's fees, the district court found that the
reasoning in Vermont Low Income Advoc. Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1976), was dispositive. 632 F.2d at 917-18 & n.4; see note 16 infra.
15 632 F.2d at 920.
16 Id. at 919. Examining the request-reply pattern, the court employed the guidelines
suggested in Vermont Low Income Advoc. Council, Inc. v. Usery (VLIAC), 546 F.2d 509 (2d
Cir. 1976), and concluded that Crooker had substantially prevailed. 632 F.2d at 919. In
VLIAC, the Second Circuit set forth the following test for determining whether a FOIA
plaintiff had substantially prevailed: "A plaintiff must show at a minimum that [the action
was] necessary and that the action had substantial causative effect on the delivery of the
information." Vermont Low Income Advoc. Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d at 513. Judge
Bownes noted that the agency reaction to Crooker's requests was neither timely, 632 F.2d at
918, nor fully responsive, id. at 919. Although the request was not difficult, the government's
reluctant and dilatory compliance differed from the efforts at "amicable resolution" which
distinguished the VLIAC situation. Id. Moreover, the government's failure to demonstrate
1981]
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FOIA "encompasses an award of attorney fees where no attorney
was involved" and concluded that it does not.17 In reaching its de-
termination, the court rejected any claim that the provision for at-
torney fees was intended either to "reward" a successful litigant or
to "punish" a recalcitrant agency. 18 Rather, Judge Bownes found
that, in permitting the recovery of attorney fees, Congress sought
to provide an economic incentive for the prosecution of claims of
agency abuse. 9 This purpose, the court concluded, was not served
by granting attorney fees where no attorney fees were incurred.20
Reasoning that a pro se plaintiff incurs no expense in litigating his
FOIA suit, the court stated that an award of fees would amount to
an impermissible payment for the plaintiff's time and effort.21 In-
stead of an incentive to pursue his disclosure rights, a recovery of
"fees" not incurred for representation by an attorney would be a
windfall.22 Judge Bownes found, moreover, that an award of costs
actually incurred would suffice to remove any economic barriers to
suits by pro se litigants.23 Therefore, a recovery confined to litiga-
tion costs would make a pro se FOIA plaintiff whole, without giv-
ing him a windfall2 4
that their subsequent "piecemeal" disclosures were causally unrelated to Crooker's suit re-
quired the conclusion that Crooker had substantially prevailed within the meaning of the
Act. Id.
In FOIA suits, the government has the burden of proof on the issue of whether a with-
holding of records was proper. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). To meet this burden, they
must prove "in a concrete manner" that the materials requested were exempt. Crooker v.
Department of Justice, 632 F.2d at 919; Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). Another procedural advantage for a plaintiff seeking informa-
tion is that FOIA cases generally are expedited at every stage of the litigation. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(D) (1976).
17 632 F.2d at 920-22.
Is Id. at 920; see Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704,711 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
19 632 F.2d at 920. The cost of a simple FOIA suit has been estimated at $1,000. Pro-
ject, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. Rv. 971, 1133
(1975). More complex suits may generate up to $70,000 in fees. Id. at 1133 n.1018.
20 632 F.2d at 920.
:I Id.
2 Id. at 921 (citing Davis v. Paratt, 608 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979); Hannon v. Security
Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976)).
21 632 F.2d at 921. Although the Crooker court's holding extends to all pro se litigants,
the identification of costs as the sole "financial barriers" seems uniquely appropriate to the
prison situation. This reasoning may be inadequate to justify denial of fees to a pro se liti-
gant who forgoes employment income to pursue his case. See note 24 and accompanying
text infra.
24 632 F.2d at 921. Another factor considered by the Crooker court in refusing to award
attorney fees to pro se litigants was the difficulty in calculating the value of a nonlawyer's
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In contrast to the First Circuit, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has held that pro se prisoner plaintiffs are not ineligible per se
for an award of attorney fees.2 15 Noting that all pro se plaintiffs
function as attorneys, the latter court has refused to disqualify a
litigant from receiving a fee award merely because he had not in-
curred expenses for a lawyer in prosecuting his claim. 26 Rather, it
has determined that a pro se plaintiff who substantially prevails
could recover attorney fees in the district court's discretion.
It is submitted that the District of Columbia Circuit has ex-
pressed the better view on whether a pro se plaintiff may recover
an attorney fee under the FOIA. Provided that the factors favoring
a fee award are present, no compelling reasons exist for denying
attorney fees to pro se litigants. The arguments for denying such
fee awards fail to consider that they may advance the aims of the
FOIA. Rather than imposing a blanket prohibition on attorney fee
awards to pro se litigants, the better view is to allow such awards,
relying on the district court to ferret out non-meritorious claims by
exercising its discretion.
services as an attorney. Id. The court noted that the factors considered in determining a
reasonable amount for attorney fees are "specifically geared toward examining the work of
an attorney." Id. The Crooker court also rejected the contention that the language of the
statute requires the award of attorney fees to pro se FOIA litigants. Id. at 921 & n.7. This
semantic argument was developed in Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Holly court stated that "[t]he
phrase 'reasonably incurred' modifies the phrase 'other litigation costs,' not the larger
phrase 'reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs,'" since the repetition of the word
"reasonable" distinguished "attorney fees" from "other litigation cost." 72 F.R.D. at 116.
Consequently, only costs would have to be actually incurred. Id. Rejecting this argument,
the Crooker court stated that it is "quite clear that a lawyer's charge for his services might
be reasonable while at the same time a client's retention of that lawyer or direction that he
perform particular services in a specific case was unreasonable." 632 F.2d at 921 n.7. Thus,
the court concluded that the "more natural reading" of the provision requires "that attor-
ney fees, like 'other litigation costs,' be actually incurred in order to be compensable." Id.
25 Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, No. 80-1421 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 1980). The
District of Columbia Circuit first enunciated its position in Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115,
116 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977), wherein it
was held that the language and intentions of the FOIA mandated awards to pro se litigants.
See note 24 supra. The court reaffirmed its position in Cox v. Department of Justice, 601
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam), holding that a complainant need not actually incur an
attorney's fee in order to be eligible for an award. Id. at 5-6. The Cox court referred to the
decision in Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1977), which awarded fees
to an attorney appearing in propria persona. See 601 F.2d at 5-6.
, Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, No. 80-1421 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 1980).
17 601 F.2d at 6-7. The circuit court remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine the propriety of awarding attorney fees in the case, and if attorney fees were proper,
the amount. Id.
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THE CASE AGAINST ATTORNEY FEES FOR PRO SE FOIA PLAINTIFFS
Although Congress' position on pro se litigants' eligibility for
attorney fee awards under the FOIA is not apparent from either
the statute or its legislative history,"8 it is clear that the courts
were empowered to award attorney fees in order to implement the
overall purposes of the Act. 9 The FOIA embodies a congressional
determination that an informed electorate is essential for the oper-
ation of democratic processes.30 Thus, the FOIA set up a mecha-
nism to promote disclosure of government information.3 1 Later, the
FOIA was amended with the intention of eliminating government
obduracy in compliance.82 Although not precisely punitive in char-
acter, the amendments embody a legislative distaste for govern-
ment foot-dragging and evasion in complying with the Act. 3 The
creation of a right to recover attorney fees was one of several pro-
visions designed to encourage private litigation as a means of dis-
couraging government noncompliance.3 4 The decision to exclude
nonattorneys appearing pro se from eligibility for an award of fees
2 See Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, No. 80-1421 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 1980).
29 S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974); accord, GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Con-
sumer's Union of United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 387 (1980); Blue v. Bureau of Prisons,
570 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1978); Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704,
711 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
10 See note 4 supra.
31 A FOIA request is relatively uncomplicated to make. After ascertaining which agency
holds the desired information, the requester must make a written application which must
comply with that agency's individual regulations, and which must include the following ba-
sic information: (1) identification of the party requesting the information, (2) specific identi-
fication of the material to be released, and (3) an address and phone number where the
requester can be contacted. [1980] Gov'T DISCLOSURE (P-H) 1 10,023-024.
32 The FOIA was enacted in 1964 to supersede the public information section of the
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-554 (1976)). Under prior law, the government could "withhold . . . virtually any
piece of information that [it did] not wish to disclose." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Seass.
4 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2418, 2421-22. As originally enacted, the FOIA suffered from many of the
problems of the prior laws. See H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267. Consequently, Congress amended the Act in
1974, strengthening the legislation to encourage private actions to compel compliance. See
Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561-64.
13 See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 385
(1980) (1974 amendments to FOIA reflect a congressional concern with "needless denials of
information"). See generally Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEx. L. REv. 1261 (1970); Nader, Freedom from Informa-
tion: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1970).
", For a discussion of other measures added to FOIA in 1974, see The Freedom of
Information Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 951 (1975).
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must be viewed, therefore, as a judicial determination not to en-
courage FOIA suits where a lawyer is not representing the com-
plainant35 While this determination may be supported by a vari-
ety of practical and policy considerations, it is -submitted that
these considerations can be accommodated without sacrificing the
policy reasons favoring the contrary view.
The Fear of Abuse Argument
The judiciary has long been apprehensive about becoming
clogged with a flood of frivolous and burdensome pro se suits.36
Indeed, one federal district court judge has characterized pro se
motions as "disorderly, numerous, repetitious, discursive, and
sometimes mad. '37 It is argued, moreover, that the award of attor-
:5 See Cox v. Department of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 6 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Cox court
stated that implicit in the congressional emphasis on judicial discretion in attorney fee
awards, was a responsibility to "encourage or discourage" certain kinds of suits. Id.
38 Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980); Graham v.
Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1977); Carter v. Telectron, 452 F. Supp. 944, 948-49 (S.D.
Tex. 1977). While recognizing the right to appear without counsel, United States v. Mitchell
137 F.2d 1006, 1010 (2d Cir. 1943), the judiciary remains apprehensive about the layman's
ability successfully to represent his own interests, Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775-
76 (2d Cir. 1944). Thus, the attitude of the courts toward the pro se litigant is necessarily
ambivalent. Describing pro se efforts as "inartistic," id. at 775, "inartfully drawn, unclear
and equivocal," Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 112 (1976), the courts nevertheless attempt
to safeguard the legal rights of the pro se litigant. In Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972),
the Supreme Court refused to dismiss a pro se complaint unless it could be said "with assur-
ance" that the plaintiff could not prove his claim. Id. at 520-21. Furthermore, the Court
indicated that pro se pleadings would be judged by "less stringent standards." Id. at 520.
Despite the demonstrations of leniency toward pro se litigation, the Court's emphasis is
clearly on professional legal assistance. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 831 (1977); The
Bounds majority stated, "[P]ro se petitioners are capable of using law books to file cases
raising claims that are serious and legitimate. . . ." Id. at 826-27. In contrast, the dissent
took the position that "access to a law library will. . . simply result in the filing of plead-
ings heavily loaded with irrelevant legalisms-possessing the veneer but lacking the sub-
stance of professional competence." Id. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
'7 Becker, Collateral Post Conviction Review of State and Federal Criminal Judg-
ments on Habeas Corpus and Section 2255 Motions-View of a District Judge, 33 F.R.D.
452, 453 (1963).
A common denominator among pro se litigants is their ignorance of the law and the
consequent inadequacy of their legal petitions, applications, and motions. Ziegler & Her-
mann, supra note 10, at 176-87; cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam)
(pro se complaints held to less stringent standards than attorneys). Lack of legal expertise,
and the concomitant judicial exasperation, is the major hurdle for pro se litigants. See, e.g.,
Marlow v. Tully, 79 App. Div. 2d 546, 547, 433 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (1st Dep't 1980). In Mar-
low, the pro se plaintiff was advised that further proceedings without counsel would only
result in "wasteful legally inappropriate procedures." Id.
The courts are especially sensitive to the threat which prisoners "with idle time and
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ney fees to nonattorneys would encourage additional spurious liti-
gation because the award of such fees would constitute a "wind-
fall."" s The reluctance of the American courts to award attorney
fees thus becomes an abhorrence in the case of awards to unde-
serving laymen.39 When the pro se litigant is a prisoner, the courts
seem particularly anxious to protect the federal fisc against claims
for fees, ostensibly since such awards are more difficult to calculate
than in the nonprisoner context.40
If the FOIA were interpreted narrowly to prohibit the award
of attorney fees to pro se plaintiffs, the potential dangers imposed
by such awards would be diminished. It is submitted, however,
that these objections should not automatically preclude awards of
attorney fees to pro se litigants under the FOIA. First, the fear of a
free paper" present to overcrowded court calendars. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463
(1972) (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). See
Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The Freedom of
Information Act was not enacted to create a cottage industry for federal prisoners"). Even
one active jailhouse lawyer can be responsible for a good deal of legal activity. Turner, supra
note 10, at 635. For a detailed study of a pro se prisoner filing 178 cases, see Carter v.
Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977). According to the Carter court, as of June
30, 1977, prisoner suits accounted for 15% of pending federal civil cases. Id. at 948. More-
over, in the pro se prisoner context, out-of-court settlements are difficult and rare. Conse-
quently, some kind of judicial action is required on virtually every case. Turner, supra note
10, at 637-38.
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974); White v. Arlen
Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 389 (4th Cir. 1980). Courts also are sensitive to accusa-
tions of fee generation, and, therefore, have attempted to stem public disapproval by main-
taining moderation in fee awards. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 469.
" Typically, the judicial arguments against pro se fees rest on the narrow premise that
only an attorney is an attorney. Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1976). In Hannon, a law school graduate, albeit unlicensed, was denied attorney fees be-
cause, as the court stated, "he was not an attorney and could not provide attorney services."
Id. at 329; accord, Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Barrett v.
United States Customs Serv., 482 F. Supp. 770, 789 (E.D. La. 1980); Burke v. Department of
Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Kan. 1976); Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 354 F. Supp. 310, 311
(N.D. Cal. 1973). This approach has been called the "closed shop philosophy." Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 491 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Generally, the courts have been less grudging with regard to the attorney who repre-
sents himself. Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Wells v. Whinery, 34
Mich. App. 626, 192 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1971). The courts reason that the attorney appear-
ing in propria persona is giving up the economic benefit of other professional opportunities.
Winer v. Jonal Corp., 169 Mont. 247, 545 P.2d 1094 (1976). See also Crooker v. Department
of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980). Moreover, the burden on the defeated party
is the same whether or not the plaintiff is an attorney. Winer v. Jonal Corp., 169 Mont. 247,
545 P.2d 1094 (1976). But see Parquit Corp. v. Ross, 273 Or. 900, 543 P.2d 1070 (1975);
O'Connell v. Zimmerman, 157 Cal. App. 2d 330, 321 P.2d 161 (1958); Cheney v. Ricks, 168
Ill. 533, 549, 48 N.E. 75, 81 (1897).
40 Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632 F.2d at 921 (1st Cir. 1980); see note 49 infra.
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flood of litigation arising from sanctioning fees for pro se parties is
often unfounded.4 1 To be sure, there has been a sharp increase in
the number of FOIA requests since the 1974 amendments were en-
acted. 2 There is no indication, however, that the cause has been
the availability of attorney fees.'3 Moreover, the pro se litigant's
chances of being put on a federal court docket are slim.4" Most
complaints are disposed of during the initial stages.' 5 Even if the
case goes to trial, the plaintiff still must prevail and satisfy the
discretionary guidelines before attorney fees may be awarded.46 In
addition, chances of abuse, if any, are minimized by applying the
discretionary factors. 7 For example, pro se plaintiffs whose acts
are merely fee-generating and serve no public purpose may be de-
nied fees on these grounds without arbitrarily barring recovery by
all pro se plaintiffs. 48 Further, abuse can be controlled through
methods devised for calculating the value of pro se services.49
41 See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1007
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Ziegler & Hermann, supra note 10, at 196-97.
42 See Open American v. Watergate Special Prosec. Force, 547 F.2d 605, 617 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (FBI received 447 FOIA requests in 1974, as compared
to 13,875 in 1975).
43 The increase might be attributed to a greater public awareness of the rights con-
ferred by the FOIA. The added burden on the judiciary is not, however, sufficient reason for
curtailing fee awards. There are alternative solutions to overcrowded courts. Institution of
an individual assignment system and the appointment of additional judges could meet any
additional burden precipitated by awards of attorney fees to pro se litigants. See Committee
on Federal Courts, Recommendations for the Improvement of the Administration of Pro Se
Civil Rights Litigation in the Federal District Courts in the Southern and Eastern Dis-
tricts of New York, 30 Rc. A.B. Crry N.Y. 107, 108 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bar Recom-
mendations]. Interestingly, one commentator has noted the connection between judicial at-
titude and judicial burden: "If those who must decide [pro se] prisoners cases feel that they
are a bothersome nuisance, most of the complaints will be read in a narrow grudging man-
ner; most of the cases will be dismissed as frivolous; and the task of deciding so many
groundless claims will indeed seem burdensome." Turner, supra note 10, at 638 n.144.
44 See Bar Recommendations, supra note 43, at 109-10; Ziegler & Hermann, supra note
10, at 160.
4 See Bar Recommendations, supra note 43, at 113 n.8. One commentator has noted:
It is apparent that it is futile for prisoners to proceed pro se. Not only is it un-
likely that the complaints will survive the.. . screening, but even assuming that
the cases are not dismissed prior to service, they will languish in the courts' dock-
ets. They are prime candidates for dismissal for failure to prosecute. Prisoners
generally have neither the knowledge nor the resources to conduct discovery and
move their cases to trial.
Turner, supra note 10, at 625.
4' See notes 5 & 7 supra.
" See notes 71-80 and accompanying text infra.
41 See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
4, The fee awarded a successful pro se litigant does not threaten the federal purse,
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The Semantic Argument
Those opposing attorney fee awards for pro se litigants also
advance two arguments based on the language of the FOIA's fee
provision. As stated previously, the FOIA sanctions an award of
especially when compared with the fee that a lawyer would receive in similar FOIA litiga-
tion. In contrast with the normal attorney's fee, Crooker requested only $165.00. Crooker v.
Department of Justice, No. 80-1421 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 1980). Cf. Jones v. United States
Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 702 (D.D.C. 1979) (pro se award of $425); Holly v. Acree, 72
F.R.D. 115, 116 ($620 awarded to pro se representative). Attorneys have occasionally been
less than circumspect in their fee requests. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244,
249 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (excessive fees charged by attorneys in civil right's case); Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974) (possible duplication of
effort by attorneys).
The problem of how to calculate an attorney fee for a nonattorney is not insurmount-
able. The District of Columbia Circuit dealt with this problem in Jones v. United States
Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 702 (1979). Therein, the pro se plaintiff, a prisoner, claimed
an hourly wage of $50.00 for 85 hours of work. Id. In determining the amount of the award,
the court noted plaintiff's inexperience as an attorney, the time spent in nonlegal activities,
and the fact that as a public ward, the plaintiff gave up no income and incurred no expense.
Id. Concluding that the plaintiff did deserve some award for his "diligence and skill," the
court reduced the hourly wage to 10 dollars. Id. Furthermore, the court discounted the
hours by one-half, attributing the excess time to plaintiff's lack of experience. Id. The deter-
mining factors in the Jones decision have been employed by other courts. For example, the
economic distinction between legal and nonlegal work has been used to reduce awards for
services performed by nonattorneys. E.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488
F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc., v. American Radiator & Stand.
Sanit. Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973). In Lamphere v. Brown, 610 F-2d 46, 48 (1st
Cir. 1979), the First Circuit found the work of paralegals "necessary and compensable," but
only at the rate of their actual hourly wage. Id. In contrast, courts frequently base awards to
attorneys on the fair market value of their services, rather than their normal hourly wage.
The fee actually incurred may not always be the fee awarded. See note 7 supra. Many
courts use a fair market value standard. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon,
521 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 495
F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 240 (1975);
Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 607 (5th Cir. 1974). In Campbell v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 539 F.2d 58, 62 (10th Cir. 1978), an award of $250 was remanded for recon-
sideration as too low in light of the $35 per hour standard offered in FOIA's legislative
history. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6275). Courts also have alluded to the legislatively nurtured opinion that
a reasonable fee in a FOIA action is $1,000 to $1,400. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Rosen, 418 F. Supp. 205, 209 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (citing H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
9 (1974)).
Generally, courts will consider a variety of factors such as customary fees, reputation,
time limitations, and results in arriving at an appropriate hourly wage. See Pete v. United
Mine Workers of Am. Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 1275, 1290 (D.C. Cir.
1975); note 5 supra. An additional factor in arriving at a fair market value is loss of income
from other employment. 81 F.R.D. at 702. Significantly, this factor is normally considered in
relation to the amount of the award. Id.; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrry, DR 2-
106(B) (1976). It has been used, however, as a rationale for denying fee awards. See Crooker
v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d at 49.
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"reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs reasonably incurred."
It is argued that "incurred" modifies "fees" as well as "costs."
Therefore, since attorney fees are not incurred by a party appear-
ing pro se, no award is proper." Alternately, it is argued that the
inclusion of nonattorneys as eligible for an award of "attorney"
fees violates the "clear language" of the statute.51 Although entic-
ingly straightforward, both arguments must fail. The first argu-
ment overlooks two situations where attorney fees are sanctioned
although no fees are "incurred" by the plaintiffs. While neither
lawyers appearing in propria persona nor legal service organiza-
tions representing FOIA plaintiffs charge their "clients" a fee, at-
torney fees under the FOIA are recoverable nonetheless.5 2 The sec-
ond argument can be overcome by focusing on an alternate
meaning of the term "attorney fees." Commonly, attorney fees are
understood to be payments for the services of a qualified lawyer.53
Additionally, however, the term may mean payments for legal ser-
vices without regard to whether or not they were performed by a
lawyer.54 Thus, "attorney" fees have been awarded to paralegals
and other persons not admitted to the bar for their work in con-
nection with litigation.5 5 The existence of this "functional" defini-
tion of the term "attorney fees" belies the argument that its mean-
ing is "clear."
80 Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980).
" Barrett v. United States Customs Serv., 482 F. Supp. 779, 780 (E.D. La. 1980); ac-
cord, Hannon v. Security Natl Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1976). It is argued further
that the absence of a specific inclusion of nonattorneys in the statute implies that Congress
did not wish to compensate them for their services. Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537
F.2d at 328.
2 Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1978); Cuneo
v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444
F.2d 143, 147 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971); Miller v. Amusement Enterps., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538-39
(5th Cir. 1970). See also Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir.
1980). The awards to legal service organizations are justified on the ground that attorneys
are actually involved. Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 n.1 (2d Cir.
1980); Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 n.7 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980)). Furthermore, the courts want to sup-
port the public interests represented by these organizations. Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc.,
v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37 (1978).
63 See note 51 supra.
5 See Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), af'd without opinion sub nom.
Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977); note 49 supra.
5 See note 49 supra.
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The Economic Barrier Argument
Opponents of awards of attorney fees in pro se suits further
argue that such awards are outside the ambit of the FOIA.5 e This
argument is based on the premise that the aim of the Act was to
promote government disclosure by removing the expense of an at-
torney as a potential deterrent to prosecuting FOIA claims. The
opponents conclude, therefore, that since the pro se litigant never
contemplates the payment of such a fee, he does not need the ben-
efit of the statute.57
Assuming arguendo that removal of economic barriers to suit
is the sole purpose underlying the decision by Congress to sanction
fee awards in FOIA suits, this argument still is unpersuasive. In-
deed, no economic barrier in the form of a bill for the services of
an attorney exists for a pro se litigant. Nevertheless, real economic
barriers in other forms do exist. It is difficult for indigent parties to
obtain legal counsel, 5 and even more difficult when the indigent
party is a prisoner.5 9 For these parties, a pro se appearance may be
the only realistic route available for forcing disclosure under the
FOIAY° The indigent's lack of means bars his appearance by an
attorney and forces him to perform this function himself. Addi-
tionally, an economic barrier may exist for nonprisoner pro se
plaintiffs since they may forego income-producing activity to pur-
sue a FOIA claim."1 Admittedly, most pro se claims are made by
'" But see LaSalle Extension Univ. v. FTC, [1980] I Gov'T DISCLOSuRE (P-H) 80, at
171 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 1980). Shermco Indus. Inc. v. Secretary of United States Air Force,
452 F. Supp. 306, 326 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
17 Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632 F.2d at 921.
68 See Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301,
306 n.16 (1973). The key to the problem Hes in the large number of people below the pov-
erty level and the small number of legal service lawyers. Id.
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 493 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
80 Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALn'. L. REv. 343, 345-46 (1968). One
commentator tersely summarized the problem as follows: "Lawyers generally require at least
a fifty dollar fee to travel to the prisons to consult with a prisoner. The ones not able to pay
this sum must resort to the next best course of action-act as their own lawyers." Id. at 345.
Even if counsel is assigned, the prisoner may be at a disadvantage since "some attorneys do
not feel an obligation to put forth their best efforts for a client who is not paying them and
who they probably will never see." Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L.
REv. 514, 526.
61 The Second Circuit has recognized that an economic barrier may be presented in
either of two ways: "by the prospect of having to pay an attorney or having to forego an
opportunity to earn one's regular income for a day or more in order to prepare and pursue a
pro se suit." Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980). See S.
REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974) (quoting Sen. Thurmond).
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prisoners who do not lose tangible economic benefits in pursuing a
FOIA claim. 2 This fact, however, does not justify a blanket ban on
pro se recovery of fees. It is conceivable that the relatively small
number of nonprisoner, pro se complaints indicates that lack of
representation and loss of income without reimbursement have
been effective economic barriers to the pursuit of the claims.
THE CASE IN FAVOR OF ATTORNEY FEES FOR PRO SE FOIA
PLAINTIFFS
The primary consideration in deciding whether pro se plain-
tiffs should be denied attorney fees must be the effectuation of the
policy underlying FOLA. In enacting the FOIA, Congress created a
disclosure statute which depended on suits by private litigants for
enforcement." When private enforcement proved ineffective,6
measures were adopted to curb government abuse of the Act by
removing the chief barriers to individual litigation. What consti-
tuted a violation of the Act was defined with greater precision; pu-
nitive measures against intentional misconduct were created;6 5 and
attorney fees became available.6 6 Indeed, these measures have been
so successful in encouraging the pursuit of FOJA rights that courts
now fear plaintiff abuse. Specifically, some courts are afraid, in the
case of pro se plaintiffs, that fee awards under the FOJA will give
rise to a "flood" of burdensome litigation and undeserved "wind-
fall" awards. Inexplicably, plaintiff abuse does not appear to be a
problem when the plaintiff is represented by a lawyer.68 It is ironic,
but in categorically refusing to award attorney fees to pro se liti-
gants, courts are refusing to apply a statutory provision aimed at
encouraging FOIA suits to a class of plaintiffs on whom the provi-
sion is having the desired effect. 9 The public benefit is real and
62 Carter v. Telectron, 452 F. Supp. 944, 046-49 (S.D. Tex. 1977). But see Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 494 n.10 (1969) (citing Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56
CALm. L. REV. 343, 345-46 (1968)).
'3 See note 4 supra,
See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
" See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (1976).
See id. § 552(a)(4)(E).
67 See, e.g., Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980);
Hannon v. Security Natl Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 329 n.1 (9th Cir. 1976).
" See Luzaich v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 31, 36 (D. Minn. 1977). Some commenta-
tors recommend the assignment of counsel as the most effective solution to the problems of
pro se litigation. Ziegler & Hermann, supra note 10, at 213.
9 See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974); accord, Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553
F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Goldstein v. Levi, 415 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 1976);
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their legal activity deserving of compensation. 0
Allowing pro se FOIA litigants to recover attorney fees need
not result in windfall recoveries and other abuses. Stringent crite-
ria must be satisfied to justify an award of attorney fees to the
FOIA plaintiff who substantially prevails.7 1 The complainant must
demonstrate an absence of commercial incentive, an appropriate
interest in the information sought, unreasonable government non-
compliance, and vindication of a public interest.7 2 By properly ap-
plying these factors, courts have the wherewithal to control poten-
tial abuse by pro se plaintiffs without shielding the government
from the payment of a fee award in a proper case. 73 For example, a
"jailhouse lawyer" who generates a stream of FOIA litigation may
be found ineligible for a fee award because of the commercial in-
centive for prosecuting his claims 74-specifically, the generation of
fee income. 5 Although the "commercial incentive" factor is usually
applied to a businessman seeking information to be used for an
economic gain,7 6 it is relevant in the pro se context as well. When
the FOIA is used to generate personal income or to acquire infor-
mation which is not of public interest, the enforcement of disclo-
sure rights becomes incidental to securing personal benefit and the
incentive of a fee award becomes superfluous.77
Similarly, the other fee award criteria will act to qualify the
Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
70 "Many of the landmark prisoner rights cases were commenced by prisoners pro se."
Bar Recommendations, supra note 71, at 114 n.13; see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963). It is submitted that pro se litigants should not be denied fee awards, regardless
of whether they forego any income in prosecuting claims. Whether a pro se claimant is a
prisoner or unemployed is irrelevant to a determination of whether he is eligible for an
award. If a suit promotes the disclosure policy of the Act, economic status alone should not
preclude an award of attorney fees. If economic status is determinative of a litigant's eligi-
bility for a fee award, some inequities would result. For example, a lawyer who comes out of
retirement to pursue a FOIA claim would be ineligible because he did not forego other
income.
7 See notes 6 & 7 supra.
71 See note 7 supra.
1 Marschner v. Department of State, 410 F. Supp. 196, 201 (D. Conn. 1979).
74 See note 7 supra.
1 See, e.g., Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc., v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir.
1979). The intentions of the Act do not include financing private actions where there is
already sufficient impetus to proceed. Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir.
1978).
" See, e.g., Fenster v. Brown, [1980] Gov'T DisCLOSURE (P-H) 79,148 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
18, 1979).
7 Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Project, Government Infor-
mation and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 1141 n.1 (1975).
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right to recover attorney fees.78 The courts are eminently capable
of balancing the four factors and arriving at a decision which re-
flects the equities of the individual case.79 The application of these
factors will serve to determine whether attorney fees are appropri-
ate and will ensure that the interests of the FOIA will be served
without denying awards to deserving plaintiffs.8 0
CONCLUSION
The FOIA presents a unique situation requiring responsive ju-
dicial interpretation: no overt wrong has been committed against
the FOIA plaintif8 1 and no damage award is available to attract
counsel. Without assertive public enforcement, a silent erosion of
Congressional policy may ensue.82 It is submitted that awards of
78 See Pope v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 962, 965-66 (S.D. Tex. 1977). In Pope, the
plaintiff, although obtaining much of the information sought, was held not to have substan-
tially prevailed. Furthermore, the government's withholding was deemed proper, there was
no public benefit, and the plaintiff's interest was commercial and personal. Id. at 966;
accord, Fenster v. Brown, [1980] Gov'T DxsCLosuRE (P-H) % 79,148 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 1979).
79 The application of the four factors for determining the appropriateness of an award
of fees requires sensitivity to the issues at hand. S. RP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1974). In Shermco Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of the United States Air Force, 452 F. Supp.
306, 326 (N.D. Tex. 1978), a fee award was granted despite a commercial interest due to the
unreasonable withholding by the defendant. Id. In contrast, the government had valid rea-
son for refusing the disclosure of the material requested in Flower v. FBI, 448 F. Supp. 567,
574 (W.D. Tex. 1978). Attorney's fees were awarded, however, because of the strong public
benefit. Id.
80 Courts are more willing to grant fees where the information sought will benefit the
public. See Goldstein v. Levi, 415 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 1976); Consumers Union of
United States v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 410 F. Supp. 63, 64 (D.D.C.
1975).
" See Clark, Holding Government Accountable: the Amended Freedom of Information
Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, 767 (1975).
82 Cf. Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972) (plaintiff's financial inability
to litigate may foster deliberate noncompliance with the civil rights laws). In Knight, the
district court had refused to award attorney's fees in a civil rights case, but the First Circuit
reversed and granted the award. Although not a FOIA case, the Knight court stated
incisively.
The violation of an important public policy may involve little by way of actual
damages, so far as a single individual is concerned, or little in comparison with the
cost of vindication, as the case at bar illustrates. If a defendant may feel that the
cost of litigation, and, particularly, that the financial circumstances of an injured
party may mean that the chances of suit being brought, or continued in the face of
opposition, will be small, there will be little brake upon deliberate wrongdoing.
453 F.2d at 853 (emphasis added).
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attorney fees to pro se FOIA litigants will further the FOIA's goal
of an informed electorate by encouraging agency compliance.
Lyn Batzar Boland
